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and liquidity risks without giving attention to operational risk. This paper tries to fill this gap and contribute to the existing literature on three levels. First, our study enriches the literature that deals with the effects of risks on bank stability which has no consensus on the results.
This justifies the need to deepen research on the risks that destabilize the banking sector in developing countries which continue to rely on this sector in financing their economies.
The second contribution lies in the use of three types of risks (credit, liquidity and operational risks) in the same econometric model. As far as we know, there are no published empirical studies that take into consideration these major risks together mainly for the Tunisian case. The last contribution of this paper is the use of all the Tunisian conventional banks and a recent database. In Tunisia, our principal sources of data concerning the banking sector are the Online Annual Reports of Tunisia"s Professional Association of Banks and Financial
Institutions. The latest available online report is that of from 2016. But this report does not contain data relating to the Franco-Tunisian Bank 1 .
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of risks on bank stability focusing on credit risk, liquidity risk, interaction of both credit and liquidity risks, and operational risk. These risks are considered as major risks namely for Tunisian banks which remained specialist. To achieve this aim, we used all Tunisian conventional banks operational during the period 2005-2015 and we used panel data analysis based on the random effect which seems to be the most appropriate method given the characteristics of our data which are doubly indexed taking into account both temporal (eleven years) and individual (twenty homogeneous banks) dimensions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Literature review is given in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to methodology. Results and discussions are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes and proposes some relevant policy implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The debate on the impact of risks on bank stability is inconclusive. The academic literature is plentiful and the empirical evidence provides different results. Findings on this subject matter can be divided into three groups. The first group of works supports the negative effect of risks on bank stability. The second group defends the positive impact. Compared to other financial institutions, banks have expertise in risk management. The bank exists because it provides liquidity and reduces transaction costs, information asymmetries and risks. Along this line of thinking, the third group of works focuses on the non-significant impact of risks on bank survival.
The negative impact of risks on bank stability has been analyzed in several studies. To investigate the main determinants of Tunisian bank stability, Hakimi et al. (2017) used a dataset of ten Tunisian banks during the period 1990-2015 and employed two different approaches (Bayesian Model Average and panel data analysis). Results converge and show that the liquidity risk and the interaction between credit risk and liquidity risk exert a negative and significant effect on bank stability. Ghenimi et al. (2017) studied the effects of liquidity risk and credit risk on bank stability using 49 banks belonging to eight countries of the MENA region (Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, Kuwait, and Yemen) over the period 2006-2013. They found that credit risk and interaction between both risks contribute to bank instability. Adusei (2015) searched the impact of bank size and funding risk on bank stability by using 112 rural banks operating in Ghana over the period from Q1 of 2009 to Q4 of 2013. To do this, the author used three measures of bank stability: Z-score, risk-adjusted return on assets (RAROA) and risk-adjusted equity on assets ratio (RAEA).
Empirical findings showed that credit risk has a negative and significant impact on bank stability when the latter is measured by RAEA. Mensi and Labidi (2015) tested the interaction between market power, diversification and financial instability of 157 commercial banks belonging to eighteen countries in the MENA region over the period 2000-2013. They confirmed that banks are poorly stable and exposed to different risks such as the liquidity risk which exerts a negative and significant impact on bank stability. Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) analyzed the relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk and their joint effect on banks" probabilities of default by using a sample of virtually all US commercial banks observed during the period 1998-2010. Their findings showed that when liquidity risk and credit risk increased separately, a bank"s probabilities of default also increased for all specifications. For the interaction between these two risks, empirical results revealed its negative and significant impact on bank stability at the 1% level of significance across all specifications.
On the other hand, other authors support the opposite result: that bank risks improve the performance of banks and ensure their stability. Shoaib et al. (2018) investigated the impact of revenue diversification on bank profitability and stability using a panel dataset of 200 commercial banks from all South Asian countries. They found that liquidity risk has a positive and significant relationship with risk-adjusted profits in all three GMM models. This means that adequate liquidity levels ensure higher risk-adjusted profitability (or stability) by guarding against the insolvency risk. Contrary to credit risk, (Ghenimi et al., 2017) confirmed that liquidity risk contributes to bank stability for the eight MENA chosen countries.
As for the third group of works, Hakimi et al. (2017) confirmed that the credit risk has no importance for the stability of Tunisian banks. Tan (2016) studied the impacts of risks and competition on bank profitability in the Chinese banking industry over the period 2003-2011 under a one-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator. Results proved that risks haven"t got any effects on bank profitability. Since profitability and stability are interdependent, bank stability is hence not sensitive to risks. Empirical results of Adusei (2015) also showed that liquidity risk is statistically insignificant for the three selected measures of bank stability. This suggests that in Ghana liquidity risk is not a significant predictor of rural bank stability.
METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the data first and model specification and variable definitions second.
Data
To examine the effects of risks on bank stability, we used all the Tunisian conventional banks operational to be operational during the period 2005-2015 due to the limitations of the availability of recent data. The evolution of the number of Tunisian banks is presented in the For the empirical approach, we performed a panel data analysis based on random effects. Based on the individual and temporal characteristics of our data, the panel data method seemed to be the most appropriate.
Model and Variable Definitions
In this paper, we used an unbalanced annual data of 215 observations for twenty Tunisian Conventional banks observed during the period 2005 -2015 to investigate the effects of credit, liquidity and operational risks on bank stability by using the econometric model written as follows: (BSTAB) is bank stability which represented the dependent variable. It was proxied in this study by both Zscore (ROA) and Z-score (ROE) leading to two econometric models. The Z-score (ROA) is equal to the mean of return on assets plus the capital adequacy ratio 2 divided by the standard deviation of return on assets. The Z-score (ROE) is equal to the mean of return on equities plus the capital adequacy ratio divided by the standard deviation of return on equities. Z-score reflected the efforts made by the bank to reduce risks and absorb losses. When the Zscore"s value was high, the bank was stable and vice-versa. Several authors used Z-score in their works to capture bank stability (Chien-Chiang et al., 2014; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014; Adusei, 2015; Köhler, 2015; Mensi and Labidi, 2015; Ozsuca and Akbostanci, 2016; Tan, 2016; Ghenimi et al., 2017; Hakimi et al., 2017; Eichler et al., 2018; Shoaib et al., 2018) .
(CR) is the credit risk measured by total loans to total assets (Adusei, 2015; Djebali and Zaghdoudi, 2017; Hamdi et al., 2017) . (LR) is the liquidity risk measured by total loans to total deposits (Ogilo and Mugenyah, 2015; Zaghdoudi and Hakimi, 2017; Ogilo et al., 2018) . (CR*LR) is the interaction of both credit and liquidity risks which can affect bank stability (Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014; Ghenimi et al., 2017; Hakimi et al., 2017) .
(OR) is the operational risk which is a non-financial organizational risk related to the internal operation of the bank and its management process, which can cause significant direct or indirect losses and a lack of trust in the bank. These losses result from failing business processes and inadequate internal procedures, staffing deficiencies, internal system failures including computer system malfunction, and adverse external events. Unlike credit and liquidity risks, operational risk has a measurement problem.
Some authors tried to measure this risk such as Elbadry (2018) and Diallo et al. (2015) who proxied it respectively by net income to total assets, and operational expense to operational revenue. In this paper, we used the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) adopted by the Basel Committee to measure operational risk. This approach is considered the most adapted to the reality of Tunisian banks which are mostly of small and medium size. It consists of calculating the required economic capital (KBIA) that can be hedged against potential failures and losses. This capital requirement is approximated by the Average Net Banking Income (ANBI) for the previous three years multiplied by a flat-rate coefficient (δ). Thus, the economic capital required KBIA = δ * ANBI. According to the Basel Committee, the coefficient δ is equal to 15%.
(PROF) is the profitability of bank measured by the net interest margin as a share of total assets (Zaghdoudi et al., 2016; Hakimi et al., 2017; Pierluigi, 2018) . (SIZE) is bank size measured by natural logarithm of total bank Assets (Alzoubi, 2017; Djebali and Zaghdoudi, 2017; Ghenimi et al., 2017; Abedifar et al., 2018; Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski, 2018; Ogilo et al., 2018; Pierluigi, 2018; Shoaib et al., 2018) . (DIVERS) is the revenue diversification of bank measured by total non-interest incomes as a share of total assets. This variable includes revenues from commissions and other net non-interest incomes (Nguyen et al., 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Hamdi et al., 2017; Shoaib et al., 2018) .
(SBM) is the structure of banking market measured by Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) which is equal to the sum of squared market share of each bank in terms of total assets of all banks (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Hakimi et al., 2017; Hamdi et al., 2017; Pierluigi, 2018) . (GROWTH) is the economic growth measured by annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski, 2018; Kim, 2018; Pierluigi, 2018) . (INF) is the inflation rate measured by the customer price index (Altaee et al., 2013; Amidu and Wolfe, 2013; Adusei, 2015; Köhler, 2015; Louati et al., 2015; Mensi and Labidi, 2015; Mndeme, 2015; Tan, 2016; Djebali and Zaghdoudi, 2017; Ghenimi et al., 2017; Eichler et al., 2018; Pierluigi, 2018; Shoaib et al., 2018) .
(POLIS) is the governance variable which "measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. The estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5" 3 . This variable is one of the six 4 governance measures compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2010) to detect institutional development of countries, which has an effect on banks" financial stability (Altaee et al., 2013) . The value of -2.5 implies weak political stability while the value of 2.5 indicates strong political stability and institutional development. (Kaufmann et al., 2010) databases respectively.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We presented variable descriptive statistics of the model and their correlation matrix. In this section, we discuss the model estimation results and their interpretation.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are used to reveal the main characteristics of data used in this study. For each variable, we derived mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values. respectively. The average income from the diversification of banks' activities was very low and equal to 1% with minimum and maximum values of -0.4% and 3.5% respectively. The average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is equal to 9%, meaning that the Tunisian banking market tends towards being a competitive structure.
Over the sample period 2005-2015, the average economic growth rate was 3% with minimum and maximum values of -1.9% and 6.7% respectively. As for the inflation rate, it was equal on average to 4% with a minimum value of 2% and a maximum value of 5.8%. The average value of political stability (Polis) was -0.29 which was is negative showing the deterioration of institutional quality which can destabilize financial and banking sectors.
Correlation Matrix
The correlation matrix gives information on the level and the nature of linkages between variables by determining the coefficients of their linear correlations. Table 3 below presents the correlation matrix of all variables used in this study.
The liquidity risk, the interaction between credit risk and liquidity risk (cr*lr) and the inflation rate were negatively correlated with both Z-score (ROA) and Z-score (ROE). Credit risk is negatively and positively associated with Z-score (ROE) and Z-score (ROA) respectively. Operational risk, profitability, size, divers, sbm, growth and polis variables were positively correlated with both Z-score (ROA) and Z-score (ROE). Table 3 reveals a high level of correlation between operational risk and size. The structure of the banking market (sbm) and (polis) variables were also highly associated. Except for these two cases, the remaining variables were weakly correlated rejecting the existence of multi-colinearity problem. 
Estimation Results of Random effect Model
In our paper, we relied on the panel data approach, which has several advantages. It increases the number of observations and that of the freedom degree, reduces the problem of co-linearity between explanatory variables and improves the estimation results.
However, before using panel data, it was first necessary to check the homogeneous specification of the data generating process by using the specification test called also the Fisher homogeneity test. Let Yit and Xit be two processes that are related by the following linear relationship:
With i and t denoting individual and temporal dimensions respectively. αi and βi are parameters that do not vary with time but differ from one individual to another. ɛit is the error term supposed white noise. In model (1), four cases are possible:
 All the constants αi are different (αi ǂ α) and all the parameters βi are different according to the individuals (βi ǂ β). In this case, we have different models that reject the panel structure.
 All the constants αi are identical (αi = α) and all the parameters βi are different according to the individuals (βi ǂ β). In this case, we also have different models that reject the panel structure.
 All the constants αi are identical (αi = α) and all the parameters βi are identical (βi = β). In this case, we have a perfectly homogeneous panel.
 All the constants αi are different (αi ǂ α) and all the parameters βi are identical (βi = β). In this case, we have a panel with individual or specific effects.
The homogeneity test consists in retaining these two last cases and comparing the two following hypotheses:
H0: ((αi = α) and (βi = β)) versus H1: ((αi ǂ α) and (βi = β)). Table 4 .
The results displayed in Table 4 show that Fisher's statistic F was equal to 21.26 and admitted a p-value of 0.0000, which was lower than 5%. We therefore accepted hypothesis H1, which insisted on the existence of a model with individual effects.
Here two cases can arise: the individual effects could be either represented by constants (in this case we would have a model with fixed effects) or could be random (we would then have a random effects model). To choose the most appropriate model, we used the well-known test of Hausman (1978) which tested the two hypotheses (H0: E (αi / Xi) = 0 versus H1: E (αi / Xi) ǂ 0)) concerning the correlation of individual effects (αi) and explanatory variables Xi.
If H0 was verified, the random effects model was chosen and the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator was retained. If H1 was verified, the fixed effects model was specified and the within estimator was kept.
In doing so, we found that for Z-score (ROA), the Hausman test value was 4.87 with p-value of 93.71% which was greater than 5%. Hence the appropriate model was the random effects model. Similarly, for the variable Z-score (ROE), the Hausman test value was 9.96 with p-value of 53.36% which was greater than 5% favoring the same model. To estimate the coefficients, we applied the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method described initially by
Alexander Aikten in 1934. This method is used to estimate an unknown parameter in a linear regression model especially in the presence of correlation between the residuals since the use of the OLS method leads to biased coefficients. We applied the GLS method to correct the problem of autocorrelation between errors" terms and improve the estimation efficiency when the variance of a parameter was not scalar variance-covariance matrix.
The results of the random-effects GLS regression are reported in Table 5 below. Note: ***. ** and * indicate level of significance respectively at 1%. 5% and 10%.
Regardless of the measure of bank stability (Z-score (ROA) or Z-score (ROE)), the results reported in Table 5 show that the stability of Tunisian conventional banks depended fundamentally on their specific factors. Liquidity risk (lr) and profitability (prof) variables were positively and significantly associated to Tunisian bank stability.
Interaction of both credit and liquidity risks ( cr * lr) and size variables are detrimental to their stability.
Profitability contributes to the stability of Tunisian banks. This finding was in line with those of Hakimi et al. (2017) ; Zaghdoudi et al. (2016) who found a positive but not significative effect. Profitability was mainly derived from income from traditional activities, notably the granting of loans and the collection of deposits. That was why liquidity risk had a positive and significant impact on the stability of Tunisian conventional banks proxied both by Z-score (ROA) and Z-score (ROE). Our result confirmed those of Shoaib et al. (2018) Results displayed in Table 5 show that the interaction of credit risk and liquidity risk (cr * lr) and size are factors that destabilize Tunisian conventional banks. The transformation of deposits into credits which improves banks' performance and ensures their stability was thwarted by credit risk which deprives banks of new investment opportunities. The negative joint impact of both credit and liquidity risks on bank stability was consistent with Ghenimi et al. (2017) and Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) . However, our result contradicts the finding of that the interaction between the two risks has a positive and insignificant impact.
The credit risk had no significant influence on the stability of Tunisian conventional banks when the latter was approximated by Z-score (ROE), but it became detrimental in the case of Z-score (ROA). This negative and significant impact of the credit risk on the survival of banks is in line with findings of several studies such as Ghenimi et al. (2017) ; Adusei (2015) and Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) . Tunisian banks have found difficulties in restituting the huge amounts of Non-Performing Loans (NPL) as illustrated in Figure 1 .
On average, Non-Performing Loans as a percentage of total loans were 15.118% over the period 2005-2015. This high ratio slows down banking activities and undermines banks" stability.
The results displayed in Table 5 show that size destabilizes Tunisian conventional banks, since it had a negative and significant impact at the 1% level of significance on the two measures of bank stability. Our findings contradict those of Adusei (2015) and Mensi and Labidi (2015) who found a positive relationship between size and bank stability. Also, Djebali and Zaghdoudi (2017) and Hakimi et al. (2017) showed that size was not significant for Tunisian bank stability. Other authors found results similar to ours: Ghenimi et al. (2017); Köhler (2015) . Tunisian banks are mostly small. This smallness contributes to their stability. This result can be explained by the quality of the leaders who lack the culture and competence required to manage large banks. In the short term, we could accept the positive and significant impact of small size on the stability of Tunisian banks. But, in the very near future when Tunisia fulfills its financial commitments to European countries under the partnership agreement signed in 1995, this small size could, on the contrary, lead to the bankruptcy of Tunisian banks which will compete with large European banking and non-banking financial institutions. This is why Tunisian banks were called upon to find solutions and make adequate restructurings to loosen the size constraint.
Findings also show that operational risk (or) and diversification of activities (divers) did not exert any significant effect on the stability of Tunisian conventional banks. This bank stability does not depend on the structure of the Tunisian bank market. The macroeconomic and institutional environments also do not affect the stability of Tunisian banks. Which do not depend on the structure of their market and both macroeconomic and institutional environments in which banks operate.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The environment in which the bank operates has become highly competitive and open to the outside world.
The bank suffers from four main types of competition: competition between domestic banks, competition from foreign banks, market competition and changing customer behavior. To counter the decline in their profitability and ensure their longevity, banks have developed risky activities.
The objective of this paper was to study the impact of risks on bank stability focusing on credit risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. These risks are considered major risks for Tunisian banks which continue to rely on basic traditional activities. We used all the non-Islamic Tunisian banks operational during the period 2005-2015 and we used panel data analysis. As far as we know, there are no published empirical studies which combine these three major risks in the same econometric model for the Tunisian case.
The empirical results indicate that the stability of Tunisian conventional banks is closely linked to factors specific to them. Whatever the measure of the bank stability (Z-score (ROA) or Z-score (ROE)), the stability of banks depends positively and significantly on their performance and their liquidity risk and negatively and
